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Proving Toxic Harm: Getting Past Slice And Dice Tactics 
Andrew S. Lipton 
INTRODUCTION PART I: BAD LAW MAKES FOR BAD RESULTS 
In complex litigation, such as personal injury or wrongful death actions 
based upon exposure to toxic and hazardous materials or pharmaceutical injuries, 
the critical issue is often one of causation: whether the substance in question 
caused the injury.1 All too often, courts buy into defendants’ arguments that the 
evidence must be sliced and diced into smaller and smaller subsets until it is 
virtually impossible to prove that the exposure caused the injury.2 Plaintiffs’ 
experts are ridiculed and attacked for reaching conclusions different from the 
corporate defendants.3 Anything not paid for by and supportive of industry is 
deemed “junk science.”4 
Texas offers us an extreme example of the obstacles put in the path of a 
plaintiff seeking to prove causation against a major corporation.5 Vioxx was a 
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory pain medication.6 Merck & Co. had put it on the 
market in May of 1999, but just a few years later, on September 30, 2004, Merck 
withdrew Vioxx from the market because clinical trials had shown the drug 
increased the risk of heart attack and other cardiovascular problems.7 Thousands 
of lawsuits were filed.8 After a number of bell-weather trials in the multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) and a number of state court verdicts, Merck agreed to a $4.85 
billion settlement of the federal multidistrict litigation.9 
While the federal court in the MDL had permitted plaintiffs’ experts to 
testify that short-term low dose use of the drug could cause heart attacks, based, 
among other things, upon their interpretation of the raw data from Merck’s 
clinical trials, the Texas Supreme Court took a radically different view in Merck 
& Co. v. Garza.10 Even though Merck had conceded that clinical trials were the 
 
* Andrew S. Lipton is admitted to practice in Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio and is Of Counsel to 
the Texas law firm of Hobson & Bradley.  He has concentrated on toxic tort cases for over thirty-five years, 
handling injury and death claims involving exposures to asbestos, benzene, beryllium, vinyl chloride, radiation, 
pesticides, and other organic solvents and toxic wastes.  Mr. Lipton may be reached at alipton@liptonlaw.net. 
1. See infra Part I. 
2. See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991). 
3. Id. 
4. Peter W. Huber described junk science as “meaningless data, fearful speculation and fantastic 
conjecture . . . elaborate, systematized, jargon-filled, serious-sounding deceptions.” HUBER, supra note 2. 
5. See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. App. 4th 2008). 
6. Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 260 (Tex. 2011). 
7. Merck & Co., Inc, 277 S.W.3d at 435. 
8. Merck & Co., Inc, 347 S.W.3d at 261–62. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 265. 
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best evidence for determining the relationship between a drug and a health 
outcome, the plaintiffs’ experts were not permitted to base their opinions on this 
data.11 Instead, Texas demanded at least two statistically significant epidemiology 
studies that show a doubling of the risk at a similar dose for a similar duration.12 
This can almost never be done because each subgroup would be too small to 
generate statistically significant results.13 If a plaintiff can somehow find two 
such studies, the court will then conduct a “secondary reliability inquiry” 
questioning the soundness of each study’s findings and underlying integrity.14 
With this impossible burden, the door slammed shut on the plaintiffs.15 
As will be discussed more fully below, Texas does not stand alone in its 
impedance of science in the courtroom. Other courts similarly demand levels of 
certainty and methodologies simply not found in the real world of science and 
epidemiology.16 The result is a protection of corporate wealth and a shifting of the 
burden of injury and disease away from the responsible party and onto the victim. 
This Article examines much of the case law regarding expert epidemiological 
testimony, the hurdles plaintiffs must overcome, and how arguments can be 
framed to enhance the likelihood that an expert’s opinion will be admitted at trial. 
Part I of this Article addresses the Supreme Court triumvirate17 that set the 
standard for the admissibility of expert scientific and technical opinions. The 
judge has been anointed gatekeeper to assess the reliability and thus admissibility 
of each expert’s opinions. Part II looks at those cases that have interpreted the 
admissibility standards so narrowly that a plaintiff’s epidemiology expert is 
rarely permitted to testify. The court achieves this by dissecting each piece of 
data that the expert relies upon to see if it withstands scrutiny and independently 
supports the opinion being offered, even when that was never the expert’s 
intention. Part III of this Article examines those judicial decisions that seek to 
understand and permit scientific testimony following methodologies actually 
used by scientists in the real world. These courts recognize the holistic approach 
so often used by real scientists outside the courtroom. Part IV highlights a 
framework for presenting a plaintiff’s epidemiology expert so as to improve the 
likelihood that the opinions will withstand scrutiny and be deemed admissible at 
trial. 
 
11. Merck, 277 S.W.3d at 435. 
12. Id. at 263–264.  
13. See Bernadette Dijkman, et. al., How to Work with a Subgroup Analysis, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION (2009), available at http://www.topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/ 
lawsuit-news/4621-merck-agrees-to-23m-vioxx-class-action-lawsuit-settlement/ (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (“The chance of falsely obtaining significant subgroup effects and interactions (i.e., type 1 errors) 
increases quite dramatically when many subgroup analyses are performed.”). 
14. Id. at 266. 
15. See generally id. at 433. 
16. Id. 
17. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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INTRODUCTION PART II: EXPERT EPIDEMIOLOGY TESTIMONY IS GENERALLY 
NECESSARY TO PROVE CAUSATION IN A TOXIC TORT CASE 
Most courts look at causation as a two-part question. First is the issue of 
“general causation”—whether the substance can cause the injury.18 The second 
issue is of “specific causation”–whether the substance caused this injury.19 
Resolution of these issues depends almost entirely upon expert opinion 
testimony.20 The admissibility of the expert opinion, governed by Federal 
Evidence Rule 702,21 is thus critical to the case. 
Two decades ago, the US Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals,22 requiring trial court judges to act as gatekeepers to assess the 
reliability and relevance of expert scientific opinions. This meant that the 
expert’s methodology had to be scientifically valid and the opinions had to “fit” 
the evidence in the case.23 
It has been my observation that, since Daubert, numerous courts have 
aggressively exercised their gatekeeper roles to reject expert causation testimony, 
particularly in toxic tort cases, due to a refusal to recognize methodologies that 
are widely accepted in the scientific community, misconceptions about the 
science, or by taking an atomistic approach that examines individually and 
independently each piece of scientific evidence that the expert relies upon.24 
Thomas O. McGarity calls this the “Corpuscular Approach to Expert 
Testimony.”25 Courts taking this “corpuscular” view have all too often rejected 
animal studies, in vitro and in vivo studies, case studies, meta-analyses, and 
weight-of-the-evidence analysis.26 When looking at epidemiologic studies, they 
have misunderstood or misapplied relative risk, statistical significance, or dose- 
response to reject expert testimony based upon generally accepted 
methodologies. Quite simply, the “corpuscular” approach slices and dices an 
expert’s opinion, and the material relied upon, into ever-smaller subparts to see if 
they can each withstand scrutiny. 
 
18. Soldo v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 244 F. Supp.2d 434, 525 (W.D. Penn. 2003). 
19. See id. 
20. See id. 
21. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based 
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
22. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
23. Id. at 591. 
24. See Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate 
Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18 (2001). 
25. See id. 
26. Id. 
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Usually this “corpuscular” view of a plaintiff’s causation expert has been due 
to the defendants’ urging, asking the court to parse the individual studies and data 
an expert relies upon, while at the same time ignoring the well-recognized 
weight-of-the-evidence methodology that permits scientific opinions based upon 
conclusions drawn from the totality of the evidence, with no individual study or 
piece of data having to be sufficient on its own to prove causation.27 The slicing 
and dicing “veg-o-matic” has made it into the courtroom at the expense of truth 
and a nuanced understanding of science. 
Fortunately, a few courts throughout the years have recognized that this 
“corpuscular” view, slicing and dicing an expert’s opinion, is not a proper 
application of Rule 702 or Daubert. For example, United States v. W.R. Grace28 
noted that Evidence Rule 702 requires a “holistic approach” to an expert’s 
opinion evidence. 
Generally, an inquiry under Rule 702 examines the expert’s testimony as 
a whole. The 702 inquiry typically does not examine the reliability or 
relevance of particular data sets that underlie the expert testimony . . . .29 
Other courts have recognized that their responsibility is not to become super-
scientists, but rather simply to confirm that the expert “employs in the courtroom 
the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in 
the relevant field.”30 The inquiry into the expert’s methodology and the reliability 
of the epidemiologic opinions to be offered is not an excuse to determine what 
the judge personally believes, but rather is supposed to focus on what expert 
epidemiologists would find reliable. “In determining whether the facts or data are 
admissible, the proper inquiry is not what the court deems reliable, but what 
experts in the relevant discipline deem it to be.” 31 
Recently, in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Product Group, Inc.,32 the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the liberal intent of Federal Evidence Rule 
702 and permitted expert testimony based upon a weight-of-the-evidence 
analysis.33 This approach “focuses upon the totality of scientific information and 
asks in a holistic way whether a cause-effect conclusion seems warranted.”34 This 
weight-of-the-evidence methodology is used by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), National Toxicology Program (NTP), Agency for Toxic 
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), Occupational Safety and Health 
 
27. McGarity, supra note 25, at 19. 
28. 504 F.3d 745 (9th Cir. 2007). 
29. Id. at 762. 
30. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
31. Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 746 (N.J. 1991).  
32. 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 
33. See generally id. 
34. McGarity, supra note 25, at 23. 
03_LIPTON_V2_3-18-14_FINAL_03.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2014 10:52 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 45 
711 
Administration (OSHA), International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
and World Health Organization (WHO), among other entities.35 It is a standard 
and reliable process for determining causation. If judges refuse to accept this 
methodology and instead use the “corpuscular approach to expert testimony,” the 
science done in the laboratory and relied upon by federal, state, and international 
regulatory and standard-setting bodies will be excluded by the courts. This is 
precisely the kind of dichotomy Daubert was intended to prevent.36 If the 
methodology is sufficiently reliable to be used in the laboratory or by a 
regulatory body, then it is sufficiently reliable for the courtroom. It is then up to 
the jury to decide if the expert’s conclusions are sufficiently persuasive. 
PART I: THE ADVENT OF THE DAUBERT ERA HAS MADE THE ADMISSION OF 
EXPERT EPIDEMIOLOGY OPINIONS FAR MORE DIFFICULT 
For decades in the past, the admissibility of expert testimony was governed 
by the Frye standard.37 Under that test, the question was whether the expert’s 
opinion had received general acceptance by at least a substantial minority of the 
scientific community.38 Unless a theory was generally accepted, it would not be 
permitted into evidence.39 This standard still remains in effect in some state 
courts, such as Illinois.40 
Then, there was a sea-change in the early 1990’s due to a US Supreme Court 
case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,41 where the high court looked at 
whether the general acceptance test should be applied to assess the admissibility 
of scientific testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence.42 In Daubert, the 
plaintiffs claimed the pregnancy drug Bendectin had caused their children’s birth 
defects.43 The plaintiffs’ experts sought to offer opinions on causation based 
upon: 
 Laboratory studies showing Bendectin was a teratogen (causes 
damage to a fetus); 
 Animal studies showing Bendectin can cause birth defects; 
 
 
35. See Thomas O. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Regulatory Science in Rulemaking and Tort: Unifying 
the Weight of the Evidence Approach, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 65, 67, 91 (2013). 
36. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
37. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. See People v. McKown, 875 N.E.2d 1029, 1031, 1036 (Ill. 2007) (stating that the Frye test applies in 
Illinois). 
41. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
42. See generally id. 
43. Id. at 582. 
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 Pharmacological studies showing the chemical structure of 
Bendectin was similar to substances known to cause birth defects; 
and 
 Meta-analyses of prior epidemiological studies.44 
The trial court threw out the expert testimony and granted summary 
judgment to the defendant.45 The court had found that the experts’ re-analyses of 
epidemiology studies were not published or peer-reviewed, and that laboratory 
research, animal studies, and pharmacological comparisons were not sufficient to 
prove Bendectin caused birth defects.46 The trial court concluded that the experts’ 
opinions were not generally accepted in the scientific community and therefore 
not admissible.47 The Court of Appeals affirmed.48 
The Supreme Court accepted the case to examine whether the Frye general 
acceptance standard was the appropriate test for the admissibility of expert 
opinions under the Federal Rules of Evidence.49 Because the Federal Rules were 
intended to liberalize the admissibility of evidence, the Court concluded that the 
old Frye Standard was no longer appropriate.50 In fact, the Court emphasized “the 
liberal thrust of the Federal Rules and their general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to opinion testimony.”51 
The Court found that under FRE 702 the judge is to act as a gatekeeper to 
make certain scientific testimony is both reliable and relevant.52 The Court 
reasoned that reliability is tied to the scientific validity of the methodology 
applied by the expert to reach the opinions to be offered.53 Relevance is tied to 
whether the opinions “fit” the facts of the case.54 
The Supreme Court suggested a number of factors, none of which were 
definitive or exclusive, that courts should consider when testing the reliability of 
an expert’s methodology: 
 whether the theory or technique can be and has been tested; 
 whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; 
 the known or potential rate of error; and 
 
44. Id. at 583.  
45. Id.  
46. Id. at 583–84.  
47. Id. at 584.  
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 585. 
50. Id. at 588. 
51. Id. at 588 (internal quotations omitted). 
52. Id. at 592–93. 
53. Id. at 590. 
54. Id. at 591. 
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 the degree the theory has been generally accepted in the relevant 
scientific community.55 
Significantly, the Court noted that the inquiry is flexible and the focus “must 
be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they 
generate.”56 Moreover, citing Rule 703,57 the court recognized expert opinions are 
to be admitted where the facts or data are “of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject.”58 
This liberalized approach to the admission of expert testimony unfortunately 
did not last long. Following Daubert, the Supreme Court revisited the question of 
the admissibility of expert opinions in General Electric Company v. Joiner.59 
There, the Court concluded that a trial court’s decision in its role as gatekeeper 
was to be reviewed on appeal by the abuse of discretion standard; that is, the trial 
court’s decision could be reversed only where it was “manifestly erroneous.”60 
Significantly, while the focus in Daubert had been solely on the expert’s 
methodology, in Joiner the Court noted that often “conclusions and methodology 
are not entirely distinct from one another.”61 Thus, the Court held that while 
experts may extrapolate from existing data and research to reach an opinion, a 
court need not accept an expert’s opinion that is connected to the underlying data 
solely by the “ipse dixit” of the expert where “there is simply too great an 
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered.”62 The door to an 
examination of an expert’s conclusions, not just methodology, was now open. 
The decision in Joiner is significant because the Court found that it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have examined the sufficiency of the 
epidemiologic studies the plaintiff’s experts had relied upon to conclude that 
PCBs could and in fact did cause the plaintiff’s lung cancer.63 Likewise, the Court 
found no abuse of discretion where the trial court had found that the experts’ 
extrapolation from various studies and animal research to reach their conclusion 
on causation was impermissible.64 
Justice Breyer, concurring, expressed concern that the gatekeeper function 
under Rule 702 asks judges to make “subtle and sophisticated determinations” 
even though these judges are “not scientists and do not have the scientific 
 
55. Id. at 593–94. 
56. Id. at 595. 
57. FED. R. EVID. 703.  
58. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595. 
59. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
60. Id. at 141– 42. 
61. Id. at 146.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 146–47. 
64. Id. at 144–45.  
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training that can facilitate the making of such decisions.”65 Justice Breyer then 
suggested that in such cases judges use FRE 70666 to “appoint an expert to serve 
on behalf of the court” to independently advise the judge about scientific 
methodology.67 
In his dissent in Joiner, Justice Stevens noted that the plaintiff’s experts had 
used a weight-of-the-evidence methodology, relying on all of the studies taken 
together, along with other available data, to reach their conclusions.68 “The 
District Court, however, examined the studies one by one and concluded that 
none was sufficient to show a link between PCB’s and lung cancer . . . . The 
focus of the opinion was on the separate studies and the conclusions of the 
experts, not on the experts’ methodology.”69 Like the Court of Appeals, Justice 
Stevens found that the weight-of-the-evidence methodology was scientifically 
acceptable and valid. “It is not intrinsically ‘unscientific’ for experienced 
professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific 
evidence—this is not the sort of ‘junk science’ with which Daubert was 
concerned.”70 
Finally, Justice Stevens found solace in the fact that the majority had not held 
that it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have admitted 
the expert testimony.71 “[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of 
 
65. Id. at 147–48.  
66. FED. R. EVID. 706. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses  
(a) Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to 
show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the parties to submit 
nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the parties agree on and any of its own 
choosing. But the court may only appoint someone who consents to act. 
(b) Expert’s Role. The court must inform the expert of the expert’s duties. The court may do so in 
writing and have a copy filed with the clerk or may do so orally at a conference in which the 
parties have an opportunity to participate. The expert: 
(1) must advise the parties of any findings the expert makes; 
(2) may be deposed by any party; 
(3) may be called to testify by the court or any party; and 
(4) may be cross-examined by any party, including the party that called the expert.  
(c) Compensation. The expert is entitled to a reasonable compensation, as set by the court. The 
compensation is payable as follows: 
(1) in a criminal case or in a civil case involving just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment, from any funds that are provided by law; and 
(2) in any other civil case, by the parties in the proportion and at the time that the court 
directs—and the compensation is then charged like other costs. 
(d)  Disclosing the Appointment to the Jury. The court may authorize disclosure to the jury that the 
court appointed the expert. 
(e) Parties’ Choice of Their Own Experts. This rule does not limit a party in calling its own 
experts. 
67. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 at 150. 
68. Id. at 151. 
69. Id. at 152–53 (citations omitted). 
70. Id. at 153. 
71. Id. at 155. 
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Evidence requires a district judge to reject an expert’s conclusions and keep them 
from the jury when they fit the facts of the case and are based on reliable 
scientific methodology.”72 
This case highlights the problem with an abuse of discretion standard for 
review of decisions on the admissibility of expert testimony.73 The trial court 
rejected the expert testimony in Joiner under the abuse of discretion standard.74 
But as Justice Stevens recognized, the Supreme Court did not say that if the 
lower court had reached the opposite conclusion it would have been an abuse of 
discretion.75 Once the expert testimony was held inadmissible, the plaintiff could 
not meet her burden of proof and summary judgment for defendant was 
inevitable.76 Yet under normal circumstances, the summary judgment would have 
been reviewed de novo and examined for any factual or legal error. Instead, the 
critical evidence was rejected under a standard looking only for gross error.77 
Finally, in Kumho Tire Company, Ltd. v. Carmichael,78 the Supreme Court 
held that the Daubert gatekeeper function applies to all expert opinions, 
including technical and other specialized knowledge, not just scientific 
opinions.79 Furthermore, the trial court has broad discretion not only in its 
determination on the admissibility of the expert opinions, but also as to the 
procedures to follow in fulfilling its “gatekeeper role.”80 While the objective of 
the gatekeeper requirement “is to make certain that an expert . . . employs in the 
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an 
expert in the relevant field,”81 that simple standard is frequently ignored, as 
evidenced by Merck & Co., Inc. v. Garza,82 where the Texas Supreme Court drew 
a bright line (requiring two statistically significant studies showing at least a 
doubling of the risk),83 even though that is not how experts in the field practice. 
While the Supreme Court’s original intention in Daubert was to liberalize the 
admission of scientific opinion testimony and permit novel but scientifically 
sound theories to be put before a jury, that all too often has not been the practical 
result. For example, on remand in Daubert, the Court of Appeals applied the new 
standard and still threw out the plaintiffs’ expert testimony.84 
 
72. Id.  
73. See id. at 155. 
74. Id. at 141. 
75. Id.  
76. Id. at 143–46. 
77. Id. 
78. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
79. Id. at 141. 
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 152. 
82. 347 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2011). 
83. Id. at 265. 
84. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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Under Daubert and its progeny, if the court determines that an expert is 
qualified, the judge then looks at the methodology, studies, and data relied upon 
by the expert to decide if these support the expert’s opinions. Under the old Frye 
standard, interpretation of studies and data was the function of the expert; and the 
court was not supposed to determine whether the expert properly relied upon data 
and studies that experts in the field generally rely upon.85 Thus, under Frye, it 
was generally deemed wrong for a judge to independently review each study or 
piece of data the expert relied upon and decide if it supports the expert’s 
opinion.86 The question was whether the opinions were generally accepted by at 
least a substantial minority of experts in the field.87 Peer review and publication 
was thus pivotal to show general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community.88 
Now, after Daubert and Joiner in particular, the judge often substitutes his 
own assessment of scientific studies for that of the expert. This is the judge as 
super-scientist. Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence in Daubert, recognized that 
Rule 702 gave the judge a gatekeeping responsibility, but he did not believe that 
the Rule “imposes on them either the obligation or authority to become amateur 
scientists in order to perform that role.”89 Unfortunately, in spite of the Chief 
Justice’s warning, too many judges look at each piece of the scientific puzzle 
separately to see if it is reliable, instead of looking at the totality of the evidence 
to see if, as a whole, it supports the expert’s opinion. Judges engage in this 
“corpuscular” or “slice and dice” process, reinterpreting the scientific studies and 
articles the experts rely upon, even though they lack the expertise and what they 
do is not consistent with good science or good law. 
The issue for plaintiffs therefore becomes how to persuade a trial judge to 
look at an expert’s methodology the way scientists look at problems and reach 
conclusions outside the courtroom, rather than defense lawyers’ approach, which 
wants the underlying basis for opinions to be parsed ad nauseum. By examining 
how some judges have misunderstood or misapplied scientific methodology at 
defendants’ urging, and how other judges have implicitly understood and 
accepted the scientific method, a framework for future arguments in Daubert 
hearings can be constructed. 
  
 
85. Donaldson v. Cen. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 767 N.E.2d 314, 324 (Ill. 2002). 
86. Id. at 326. 
87. Id. at 323–24. 
88. See generally Donaldson, 767 N.E.2d at 314. 
89. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600–01. 
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PART II: MISPLACED ATTACKS ON EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE IMPROPERLY 
KEEP PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERTS AT BAY 
As noted above, one of the greatest problems found in decisions from courts 
considering expert epidemiological testimony is the failure or refusal of judges to 
look at the science in the same manner as scientists: the court “slices and dices” 
the studies and other data relied upon by the expert to determine if each piece of 
the total puzzle independently supports the expert’s opinion. Of course, this is 
precisely what the defendants want and urge the court to do. By taking this 
approach, courts ignore general scientific principles, misinterpret and misapply 
generally accepted methodology, and reach distorted and incorrect results. These 
courts refuse to apply in the courtroom the same methodology that scientists use 
in the field, and American and international regulatory and standard-setting 
bodies apply. While the court in Joiner may have said this is not an abuse of 
discretion, it certainly is bad science and bad policy.90 
In Henrickson v. ConocoPhillips,91 the plaintiff claimed his acute 
myelogenous leukemia (AML) was caused by benzene found in the gasoline he 
was exposed to when he worked in a terminal and as a gasoline tanker driver.92 
There was no dispute that benzene causes AML.93 However, the court focused on 
defendant’s argument that benzene in gasoline cannot cause AML.94 The court 
said it could not presume that the qualitative toxic and carcinogenic effects of 
benzene from all sources are the same and questioned whether benzene in 
gasoline was somehow different from benzene alone.95 The court also questioned 
whether the small amount of benzene in gasoline (one to two percent) was 
enough to cause AML.96 
In conducting its gatekeeper role, the court stated that to extrapolate from 
benzene studies to gasoline containing benzene, the experts “must explain and 
demonstrate why the extrapolation is scientifically proper.”97 Plaintiff’s expert 
epidemiologist had done just that, stating in his report that the “toxicity of 
gasoline to the bone marrow has mirrored the toxicity of benzene even though 
the literature related to gasoline has lagged that of benzene.”98 He pointed to 
studies of “occupational exposure to gasoline containing 1-2% benzene [that] 
demonstrate an elevated risk of leukemia, including AML, with cumulative 
 
90. See generally General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
91. 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142 (E.D. Wash. 2009). 
92. Id. at 1148. 
93. See id. at 1156 (indicating that the only “question before the court is whether exposure to the 
benzene–component of gasoline is capable of causing AML”). 
94. Id at 1156.  
95. Id.  
96. Id.  
97. Id. at 1156.  
98. Id. at 1151.  
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benzene exposures of as low as 1.5 ppm-years.”99 He also showed 
epidemiological studies “demonstrat[ing] ‘significantly elevated risks’ of AML 
among those who transport gasoline and those who are engaged in terminal 
work . . . where gasoline is loaded and unloaded.”100 And finally, he noted that the 
“genotoxic effects of benzene in gasoline support the biological plausibility of 
gasoline to induce leukemia.”101 
The court concluded that the expert’s general causation testimony “must be 
excluded because the studies [he relied] upon singly or in combination [did] not 
support the causation conclusions [he made].”102 The court was persuaded by the 
defendant’s arguments even though they were based upon contradictory and 
inconsistent epidemiological evidence, such as refinery studies which did not 
even show AML was caused by benzene (a generally recognized fact) and 
compared occupational exposures to exposures in the general population 
(ignoring the healthy worker effect).103 Clearly, the judge improperly weighed 
contradictory evidence and chose to adopt the defendant’s arguments. 
On the issue of epidemiological studies, the court noted that plaintiff’s expert 
had relied upon studies that just showed positive associations (relative risk (RR) 
< 2) but not a supposedly definitive causal relationship (RR > 2).104 In general, 
epidemiological studies are most often used to prove general causation.105 “[A] 
relative risk greater than 1.0” means the substance “has the capacity to cause the 
disease.”106 A relative risk above 2.0 implies a probability that the agent at issue 
caused the illness being studied.107 It also indicates “that the agent more likely 
than not was responsible for a particular individual’s disease.”108 This means that 
a relative risk that is greater than 2.0 is probative evidence of both general and 
specific causation.109 
But the Henrickson court, like so many others, refused to permit reliance on 
studies showing a RR < 2 as just one piece of a puzzle showing general 
causation, even though epidemiologists routinely rely upon such studies in their 
scientific practice. Confusion over relative risk has become a major problem in 
Daubert reviews because of this growing refusal to consider RRs < 2 as being 
 
99. Id. at 1168.  
100. Id. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 1175. 
103. See, e.g., Bernard D. Goldstein & Stuart L. Shalat, The Causal Relation Between Benzene and 
Multiple Myeloma, 95 BLOOD 1512, 1512 (Feb. 15, 2000); Peter F. Infante, Benzene Exposure and Multiple 
Myeloma: A Detailed Meta-Analysis of Benzene Cohort Studies, 1076 ANN. OF N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 90, 90–91 
(2006). 
104. Henrickson, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 
105. Id. at 1158. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
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reliable in conjunction with other evidence to prove general causation.110 The key 
to the bad result in Henrickson was the court’s refusal to look at the totality of the 
evidence or to examine the methodology applied by experts: conclusions based 
upon all the pieces of the puzzle in conjunction, not piecemeal.111 
Another example of slicing and dicing can be found in Valentine v. 
Conrad.112 There, the plaintiff had worked in a laboratory at a PPG Industries 
paint plant and was exposed to various toxic chemicals, including organic 
solvents such as benzene.113 He developed glioblastoma multiforme and died. The 
widow sought workers compensation where she only had to show that something 
in the work environment had “contributed” to her husband’s brain tumor.114 
The Ohio Supreme Court, applying the Daubert standard, held that in 
analyzing the methodology and reliability of an expert’s opinion, the trial court 
must “apprise itself of the details of the proffered evidence.”115 Thus, in Ohio, 
courts are required to examine each of the studies that an expert relies upon and 
decide if it supports what the expert claims.116 This clearly turns the judge into a 
super-scientist who examines studies and data relied upon by experts, re-
interprets them, and decides if they support the expert’s opinions. 
The court in Valentine concluded that none of the studies that the plaintiff’s 
expert witnesses relied upon involved workers in the same industry, none showed 
a direct causal relation between a single specific chemical and brain tumors, and 
animal studies were not adequate to prove causation.117 So, the court sliced and 
diced the studies and data relied upon by the experts, found that each individually 
did not support the experts’ opinions, and excluded the testimony, leading to 
summary judgment for the defendant.118 
But the majority decision failed to address significant evidence that played a 
critical part in the experts’ methodology.119 Mr. Valentine and a coworker died 
within a week of each other.120 Both had glioblastoma multiforme.121 Both had 
worked for thirty years in the same lab and were exposed to the same chemicals.122 
 
110. This is evident in the recent Texas Supreme Court decision rejecting reliance on any study with a 
relative risk <2. See generally Merck & Co. Inc. v. Garza, 277 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2008). A bright-line legal test 
has replaced science. 
111. See generally Henrickson, 605 F. Supp 2d. 
112. 850 N.E.2d 683 (Ohio 2006). 
113. Id. at 685. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 687. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 688. 
119. Id. at 689. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
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There were only seventeen people with these exposures for this length of time.123 
The odds of the two of them dying like this were 1 in 1,442,206.124 
Moreover, various studies cited by the experts showed that workers exposed to 
the same types of toxic chemicals found in the PPG lab developed brain tumors.125 
These studies included a petrochemical research facility and a petrochemical 
plant.126 They also included a study of workers in China showing persons exposed 
to organic solvents had a significantly elevated risk for brain cancer.127 The experts 
also cited studies showing that lab technicians and chemists who, like Mr. 
Valentine, routinely handled solvents had a higher than expected incidence of brain 
cancer.
128
 Plaintiff’s neurosurgeon also cited genetic research showing that animals 
exposed to benzene developed the same type of brain tumor as Mr. Valentine.129 He 
concluded that the cumulative evidence in the medical literature and his twenty-
five years of experience provided a substantial basis for the opinion that long-term 
excessive exposure to the solvents and other cancer-causing chemicals identified in 
Mr. Valentine’s work environment can cause brain cancers such as glioblastoma 
multiforme.130 
As the dissent concluded, “These witnesses were not ‘hired guns.’ They did 
not use unscientific principles and methodology. These opinions are not ‘junk 
science.’”131 But the court threw out the testimony by looking at each piece of 
evidence that the experts relied upon separately and finding that it alone was not 
sufficient to support the opinion on causation.132 The court refused to accept that 
scientists look at the totality of the evidence, not just individual bits in isolation.133 
A litany of other cases has rejected epidemiologic testimony for various 
reasons. For example, the court in Castellow v. Chevron USA, Inc.134 refused to 
accept opinion testimony based on case reports on the grounds they were 
“unscientific and speculative.”135 Similarly, the court in LeBlanc v. Chevron USA, 
Inc.136 held that “individual case reports, while interesting, do not constitute reliable 
scientific evidence” to support an opinion on general causation.137 That same court 
 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 689. 
125. Id. at 691. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 691. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 693. 
132. Id. at 687–88 
133. Id. 
134. 97 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
135. Id. at 787. 
136. 513 F. Supp. 2d 641 (E.D. La. 2007). 
137. Id. at 663–64. 
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later refused to permit opinion testimony based on a meta-analysis because the 
underlying studies did not independently show a statistically significant risk.138 
Many courts have endorsed the view that an expert’s reliance on 
epidemiological studies must be delved into in detail, with the court reviewing and 
judging each and every study the expert relied upon. Thus, in Kilpatrick v. Breg, 
Inc.,139 the court held that it was proper for the lower court to analyze each study in 
detail to determine its independent reliability.140 The court also found that the use of 
case reports was not a scientific methodology.141 
Magistrani v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning142 considered the 
admissibility of expert testimony based upon the weight-of-the-evidence 
methodology, where the expert evaluated multiple types of studies and data, such 
as epidemiology studies, in vitro and animal studies, toxicology studies, and 
biological plausibility. Then, taking all of the information as a whole, the expert 
reached his opinion.143 The court found that the expert’s opinion was not admissible 
because there was no reliable scientific method dictating how to weigh all of this 
evidence.144 Rather, the court accepted the defense expert’s opinion that each 
underlying study and piece of evidence must be separately analyzed and its 
reliability independently assessed.145 In other words, an expert cannot look at the 
totality of the evidence and determine that the whole is greater than the sum of its 
parts.146 
Similarly, in Knight v. Kirby Inland Marine, Inc.,147 the court rejected a weight-
of-the-evidence analysis by looking at the fifty-plus studies relied upon by the 
expert and concluding that none standing alone gave an adequate basis for the 
causation opinion.148 The court simply ignored or misunderstood the weight-of-the-
evidence methodology.149 
PART III: JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE METHODOLOGY USED BY REAL WORLD 
SCIENTISTS WILL LEAD TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT OPINIONS 
Other courts have chosen not to become amateur scientists or to adopt 
defense arguments lock, stock, and barrel, instead simply doing what FRE 702 
 
138. 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106339, at *13 (E.D. La. 2009). 
139. 613 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2010). 
140. Id. at 1341. 
141. Id. at 1339. 
142. 180 F. Supp. 2d 584 (D. N.J. 2002). 
143. Id. at 599–600. 
144. Id. at 601–02. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. 482 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2007). 
148. Id. at 355. 
149. See generally id. 
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and Daubert require: confirm that the expert is applying the same rigor in the 
courtroom as would be applied in the laboratory and before federal, state, and 
international regulatory and standard-setting bodies. 
The critical determination is whether comparable experts accept the 
soundness of the methodology, including the reasonableness of relying 
on this type of underlying data and information. Great difficulties can 
arise when judges, assuming the role of scientist, attempt to assess the 
validity of a complex scientific methodology.150 
The court in Rubanick was particularly concerned about a trial judge trying 
to second-guess an expert. 
[T]he trial court here “independently reviewed” each of the thirteen 
studies on which [the expert] relied, and decided that they “do not say 
what plaintiff’s expert concludes.” In engaging in such an analysis, the 
court substituted its own assessment of the studies for that of an 
acknowledged expert. [However,] “[t]he interpretation of the data . . . is 
the function of the qualified expert . . . . [C]ourts should be loath to 
determine whether the particular expert has properly relied upon data 
which experts in the field generally rely on.”151 
The actual inquiry should not be about the judge’s personal interpretation of 
the underlying scientific support for an expert’s opinion, but rather the reliability 
of the expert’s methodology. 
Thus, the inquiry is not the reliability of the expert’s ultimate opinion nor 
is it whether the expert thought his or her own reliance on the underlying 
data was reasonable, nor whether the court thinks that the expert’s 
reliance was reasonable. The proper inquiry is whether comparable 
“experts in the field [would] actually rely” on that information.152 
Not all courts have accepted defendants’ efforts to reduce an expert’s opinion 
and methodology ad absurdum. In Ruff v. Ensign-Bickford Company,153 the 
plaintiffs had been diagnosed with non-Hodkins Lymphoma (NHL), allegedly 
due to chemicals in the water they drank.154 The plaintiffs’ experts showed that 
the chemicals at issue could cause NHL, but the defendant argued that there are 
several subtypes of NHL, and plaintiffs should be required to show that the 
specific subtype at issue was caused by the chemicals to which they were 
 
150. Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 748 (N.J. 1991) (citation omitted).  
151. Id. at 749 (internal citations omitted). 
152. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
153. 168 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2001). 
154. Id. at 1273–74. 
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exposed.155 The court held that studies of the exact subtype of NHL were not 
necessary.156 Rather, the defendant’s argument could be used on cross-
examination to challenge the weight of the testimony; it did not go to 
admissibility.157 
Recognizing that Rule 702 was intended to relax traditional barriers to expert 
opinion testimony, the court in Cook v. Rockwell International Corp.158 held that 
a liberal standard should be applied and doubts should be resolved in favor of 
admissibility.159 The court noted that “epidemiology cannot objectively prove 
causation; rather causation is a judgment by epidemiologists and others 
interpreting epidemiological data.”160 The court then concluded that opinions 
based on studies showing even a weak association between exposure and disease 
are not unreliable per se as a matter of science or law.161 Rather, the weakness of 
the association goes to the weight to be given to the opinion testimony.162 
Similarly, admissibility does not depend upon statistically significant results.163 
“The statistical significance or insignificance of [a study’s] results may affect the 
weight given to [the expert’s] testimony, but does not determine its admissibility 
under Rule 702.”164 
In McClellan v. I-Flow Corp.165 the defendants argued that studies showing 
just an association between a condition and a disease (i.e., a RR <2) could not 
reliably support a causation opinion.166 Rather, they demanded “conclusive” 
evidence of causation before an opinion could be admissible.167 The court rejected 
this argument outright.168 Expert testimony based on studies showing “only” an 
association should not be excluded where the expert can explain “why the 
association is valid and how causation can be inferred . . . .”169 The court also 
permitted reliance upon in vitro and in vivo animal studies, as well as case 
reports, because scientists and doctors rely upon these types of studies, as 
evidenced by the use of these types of studies in the scientific literature.170 Rule 
702 does not impose on the court either the obligation or the authority to become 
 
155. Id. at 1279. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. 
158. 580 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Colo. 2006). 
159. Id. at 1082. 
160. Id. at 1095. 
161. Id. at 1097–98. 
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 1103. 
164. Id. 
165. 710 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D. Or. 2010). 
166. Id. at 1100. 
167. Id. at 1101. 
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 1102 (internal citations omitted). 
170. Id. at 1110–11. 
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an amateur scientist in order to perform the gatekeeping function. “‘[A]nalogy, 
inference and extrapolation can be sufficiently reliable’ when the expert’s 
opinion is the ‘kind that a reasonable scientist or physician would make in a 
decision of importance arising in the exercise of his profession outside the 
context of litigation.’”171 
King v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company 172 is one of the best 
primers on the admissibility of epidemiologic evidence. It lays out in simple 
terms virtually every issue that might arise in considering an epidemiologist’s 
opinion testimony and explains how the courts should approach and resolve these 
questions.173 
The court starts with the notion that “epidemiological studies cannot prove 
causation, they can [only] provide a foundation for an epidemiologist to infer and 
opine that a certain agent can cause a disease.”174 Thus, contrary to defendants’ 
usual arguments, a study cannot objectively prove or disprove causation.175 
Rather, the strengths and weaknesses of associations found in epidemiological 
studies must be assessed.176 This requires judgment as to how the findings fit with 
other scientific information.177 
The court then discussed relative risk as one of the cornerstones for causal 
inferences.178 Where a study shows a relative risk greater than 1.0, a positive 
association exists to support a causal inference.179 The greater the relative risk, the 
greater the likelihood that the relationship is causal.180 If the relative risk is 
greater than 2.0, this means a greater than fifty percent likelihood the agent 
caused the disease, permitting an inference of both general and specific 
causation.181 But in considering relative risk, the questions of potential sources of 
error and statistical significance also arise.182 The court noted that a poorly 
designed or executed study that is “statistically significant could be less reliable 
than a well-conceived and conducted study that is not statistically significant.”183 
Thus, the inquiry into causation is not just about whether or not there is a high 
enough relative risk that is statistically significant. Rather, “it involves subjective 
judgment. Experts consider several factors under different sets of criteria that can 
 
171. Id. at 1110. 
172. 762 N.W.2d 24 (Neb. 2009). 
173. See generally id. 
174. Id. at 36.  
175. See id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id.  
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 36–37. 
182. Id. at 137. 
183. Id. at 39. 
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point to causation. Relative risk presents only one factor that they consider.”184 
The court then concluded as to relative risk: 
So we decline to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, or any other 
statistical measurement, above the minimum requirement that the study 
show a relative risk greater than 1.0. We agree that “it would be far 
preferable for the district court to instruct the jury on statistical 
significance and then let the jury decide whether many studies over the 
1.0 mark have any significance in combination.” In short, the 
significance of epidemiological studies with weak positive associations is 
a question of weight, not admissibility.185 
Regarding statistical significance, the court concluded: 
We agree that statistical significance is the most obvious way for a court 
to determine that researchers properly ruled out random variations in the 
population sample accounting for the result. But those decisions 
requiring a study’s relative risk to be statistically significant have come 
under fire. Experts have pointed out that the lack of statistical 
significance does not demonstrate that there is no relationship. So not all 
courts impose a requirement of statistical significance. We also decline 
to impose a statistical significance requirement if an expert shows that 
others in the field would nonetheless rely on the study to support a 
causation opinion and that the probability of chance causing the study’s 
results is low.186 
The court also considered the weight-of-the-evidence methodology, which 
“comprehensively analyzes the data from different scientific fields.”187 As Justice 
Stevens had said, “it cannot be intrinsically ‘unscientific’ for experienced 
professionals to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all available scientific 
evidence.”188 The court also recognized that there is no generally accepted 
method for determining how much weight to apply to different types of studies.189 
Yet the US EPA uses this methodology to assess risk,190 showing that the 
methodology is applied by scientists functioning in the real world outside of the 
courtroom. 
 
184. Id.  
185. Id. at 46.  
186. Id. at 47. 
187. Id. at 39.  
188. Id.  
189. Id. at 40. 
190. Id. at 39–40. 
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Alternatively, the court considered the Bradford Hill factors used by 
epidemiologists to assess causation.191 These factors include (1) temporal 
relationship, (2) strength of the association, (3) dose-response relationship, (4) 
replication of the findings, (5) biological plausibility, (6) consideration of 
alternative explanations, (7) cessation of exposure, (8) specificity of the 
association, and (9) consistency with other knowledge.192 Yet these factors are not 
mandatory criteria etched in stone. One or more of the factors may be absent, 
they may be weighted differently depending upon the circumstances, and a 
subjective element is present in judging whether causation exists.193 
The court next looked at dose-response, “a hallmark of toxicology.”194 While 
some courts require proof that a plaintiff’s actual exposure to an agent was at a 
level proven to be dangerous, the court noted that a dose-response relationship is 
not essential to proof of causation.195 Moreover, an expert may be able to infer the 
exposure level without precise exposure information.196 In fact, rarely do 
exposures occur in a manner that permits a quantitative determination.197 Thus, 
semiquantitative or qualitative estimates of exposure may be sufficient.198 
Finally, the court noted that, at heart, an expert’s opinion must be based on 
good grounds, derived by the scientific method and supported by appropriate 
validation, not subjective belief or unsupported speculation.199 “If the underlying 
data are so lacking in probative force and reliability that no reasonable expert 
could base an opinion on them, an opinion which rests entirely upon them must 
be excluded.200” The focus should be on “whether no reasonable expert would 
rely on the studies to find a causal relationship—not whether the parties dispute 
their force or validity.”201 The court concluded that “while the trial court acts as 
the evidentiary gatekeeper, it is not a goalkeeper.”202 
What started out as another case of slicing and dicing to reach summary 
judgment for a defendant, turned out on appeal to be a major victory for science 
in the courtroom and the generally-accepted methodology of looking at the whole 
picture. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Product Group, Inc.203 involved a plaintiff 
who developed acute promyelocytic Leukemia (APL), a subtype of acute 
 
191. Id. at 40. 
192. Id.  
193. Id.  
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 41. 
196. Id.  
197. Id.  
198. Id. 
199. Id. at 43. 
200. Id. at 45. 
201. Id. at 49.  
202. Id. at 43. 
203. 664 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d 639 F. 3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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myeloid leukemia (AML), from benzene exposure.204 Plaintiff’s expert offered 
the opinion that a number of factors, taken together, showed a causal relationship 
between benzene and APL.205 The expert noted that APL is just a subtype of 
AML; that all AML subtypes derive from genetically damaged stem cells; and 
that all AMLs involve transposition of chromosomes.206 Moreover, most 
epidemiology studies do not differentiate between subtypes of AML.207 The 
defendant and its experts, on the other hand, argued that while benzene has been 
shown to cause some types of AML, it has not been shown to cause all subtypes, 
such as APL.208 
The plaintiff in Milward offered at the Daubert hearing, in addition to the 
testimony of its causation expert, the opinions of an expert on scientific 
methodology to support the methodology utilized by plaintiff’s trial expert.209 
This has become a common tactic used by defendants to challenge plaintiffs’ 
experts but has been a less common device utilized by plaintiffs. It was extremely 
effective and helpful in Milward.210 
The methodology expert addressed in his initial report (and then a 
supplemental declaration responding to the defense experts) the basic principle 
that scientists not only disagree on ultimate conclusions but also often disagree 
on applicable theories, what evidence should be considered, and the weight to 
give the various matters considered.211 Moreover, “quite respectable scientists 
may reasonably differ in their scientific judgments even if they agree on the same 
data and on considerations that guide theory choices.”212 The plaintiff’s 
methodology expert then noted: 
[A] scientist, in reviewing and assessing all the scientific evidence for a 
conclusion . . . must consider and integrate all the available relevant 
evidence, utilizing his or her professional judgment to come to a 
conclusion about the best explanation to account for an observed 
association. Moreover, this review should include consideration of all 
available and relevant human evidence, evidence from experimental 
animals, scientific reviews, chemical structure-biological activity 
evidence, various kinds of mechanistic evidence (which may or may not 
 
204. Id. at 140. 
205. Id. at 142.  
206. Id. at 143–44.  
207. Milaward v. Acuity Specialty Prod. Group, Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 24 n.18 (1st Cir. 2011). 
208. Milward, 664 F. Supp 2d at 146.  
209. Milward, 639 F.3d at 19. 
210. See id. 
211. Id. at 21 n.14. 
212. Supplemental Declaration of Carl F. Cranor, PH.D, M.S.L., at ¶ 4 Milward v. Acuity Specialty 
Products Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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be available), a range of experimental studies that could assist inferences 
and so on.213 
As the methodology expert stated, the weight-of-the-evidence methodology 
is used by the IARC and the US Toxicology Program “for determining whether a 
substance is a known or probable human carcinogen.”214 He also explained: 
As part of a review of the science, whether for assessing claims in 
physics or human health, scientific judgment is critically involved not 
only for drawing the ultimate conclusions, but also for a number of steps 
along the way . . . . An expert reviews the body of data that appear to 
bear on causal judgments, selects the scientifically relevant data, assesses 
and weighs studies for their quality, weighs the importance of different 
kinds of data vis-à-vis one another (e.g., animal studies versus human 
studies versus short-term studies versus structure-activity relationships 
versus mechanistic evidence versus any case studies and so on), and 
brings her background understanding of biology and toxicology, as well 
as her understanding of the phenomena, to the causal issues. Scientific 
judgment also enters into integrating all the data and how it bears on 
evaluating different possible explanations in light of all the evidence and 
the particular phenomena to be explained (e.g., a disease).215 
The expert then analyzed the defense experts’ opinions at length, accusing 
them of “an impoverished conception of scientific evidence” contrary to national 
and international scientific approaches.216 He showed how the defense 
disregarded scientific evidence contrary to procedures at NTP and IARC, 
misused the Bradford Hill considerations (not mandatory criteria as defendants 
would have the court believe), and ignored selection bias in the studies they 
relied upon.217 
Thus, plaintiff’s methodology expert was able to give the court an overview 
of the weight-of-the-evidence scientific methodology, an appraisal of what the 
plaintiff’s expert had done and why it was consistent with scientific processes 
used nationally and internationally, and a critique of the defense experts’ bias and 
misuse of accepted methodology.218 As seen from the result in Milward, using a 
separate expert from the testifying expert offering the substantive opinions for 
trial can be an effective and persuasive strategy.219 
 
213. Id. at ¶ 5. 
214. Id.  
215. Id. at ¶ 6 (footnote omitted). 
216. Id. at ¶ 8. 
217. Id. at ¶ 9–10, 14–15. 
218. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text. 
219. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Product Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d 639 F. 
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In spite of all the plaintiff’s expert’s testimony, the trial court held that 
plaintiff’s expert could not extrapolate from general benzene studies or studies of 
other subtypes to APL because the chromosome translocations were not 
identical.220 Nor was the expert permitted to testify based upon the totality of 
similarities among AML subtypes.221 The trial court also noted the absence of 
epidemiology studies showing a causal connection between benzene and APL 
even though there are not enough cases of APL to support a statistically 
significant epidemiology study.222 The result was that the defendants were able to 
exclude expert testimony by slicing and dicing the disease into subtypes for 
which it is impossible to conduct epidemiology studies, and then convinced the 
court that in the absence of epidemiology studies there can be no proof of 
causation. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in what must be viewed as 
a major victory for plaintiffs.223 Recognizing this, the defendants have petitioned 
the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.224 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by noting that courts are not 
“empowered to determine which of several competing theories has the best 
provenance.”225 It then noted, quoting Daubert, “So long as an expert’s scientific 
testimony rests upon ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known, it should be tested 
by the adversarial process, rather than excluded for fear that jurors will not be 
able to handle the scientific complexities.”226 If all courts followed this tenet, the 
admissibility of expert testimony would be less about slicing and dicing an 
expert’s opinion and methodology and more about whether the expert followed 
practices relied upon real scientists functioning in the real world. 
Milward’s expert had applied the weight-of-the-evidence methodology by 
applying the Bradford Hill “viewpoints”227 for determining causation to five 
bodies of evidence.228 The Court of Appeals recognized that scientific judgment is 
 
3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 
220. Id. at 144. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at 146.  
223. 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 
224. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Milward, 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 2012 U.S. Lexis 229 (U.S. 
Jan. 9, 2012) (No. 11-316). 
225. Milward, 639 F.3d at 15 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
226. Id. 
227. The Bradford Hill “viewpoints” involve consideration of nine factors, none of which are conclusive 
and not all need be present. Moreover, the various criteria cannot be ranked into any kind of hierarchy of 
significance. The Bradford Hill factors are:  
[T]he strength or frequency of the association; the consistency of the association in varied circumstances; 
the specificity of the association; the temporal relationship between the disease and the posited cause; the 
dose response curve between them; the biological plausibility of the causal explanation given existing 
scientific knowledge; the coherence of the explanation with generally known facts about the disease; the 
experimental data that relates to it; and the existence of analogous causal relationships. 
Id. at 17. 
228. These included “the fact that benzene causes AML as a class, that all subtypes of AML likely have a 
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necessary to conduct the weight-of-the-evidence analysis. Quoting Comment (c) 
to the Third Restatement of Torts §28, the court noted, “No algorithm exists for 
applying the Hill guidelines to determine whether an association truly reflects a 
causal relationship or is spurious. Because ‘[n]o scientific methodology exists for 
this process . . . reasonable scientists may come to different judgments about 
whether such an inference is appropriate.’”229 Thus, the evaluation of scientific 
evidence requires judgment and interpretation similar to that used in a differential 
diagnosis. The court recognized: 
The fact that the role of judgment in the weight of the evidence approach 
is more readily apparent than it is in other methodologies does not mean 
that the approach is any less scientific. No matter what methodology is 
used, “an evaluation of data and scientific evidence to determine whether 
an inference of causation is appropriate requires judgment and 
interpretation.” [Thus], [n]o serious argument can be made that the 
“weight of the evidence approach is inherently unreliable.”230 
The trial court had looked at all the evidentiary components of the expert’s 
analysis atomistically, requiring the ultimate opinion to be supported by each 
piece of evidence independently. But under the weight-of-the-evidence approach, 
no body of evidence was itself treated as justifying an inference of 
causation. Rather, each body of evidence was treated as grounds for the 
subsidiary conclusion that it would, if combined with other evidence, 
support a causal inference. The district court erred in reasoning that 
because no one line of evidence supported a reliable inference of 
causation, an inference of causation based on the totality of the evidence 
was unreliable . . . .The hallmark of the weight of the evidence approach 
is reasoning to the best explanation for all of the available evidence.231 
The court noted that the fact that there might be another explanation for the 
evidence is not a sufficient basis for excluding the expert testimony.232 Any 
alleged flaws go to the weight to be given the opinion, not its admissibility.233 
Lastly, the court looked at the epidemiological evidence that the plaintiff’s 
expert had relied upon. The court concluded that the paucity of epidemiological 
 
common etiology, that benzene is known to cause the general types of cellular damage that are known to cause 
APL, that benzene is known to inhibit an enzyme whose inhibition is known to cause APL, and that APL has 
been reported in benzene-exposed workers in a number of epidemiological studies.” See id. at 20. 
229. Id. at 18 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 28 reporters’ note cmts. c(3) and c(4) (2010).  
230. Id. at 18–19. 
231. Id. at 23. 
232. Id. at 22. 
233. Id.  
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studies did not make it “almost impossible” for the expert’s opinion to be 
admissible, as the defendants had argued.234 “Epidemiological studies are not per 
se required as a condition of admissibility regardless of context.” 235 Here, the 
rarity of the disease makes it very difficult to perform an epidemiological study 
of the causes of APL.236 Moreover, the lack of statistically significant studies was 
not a deviation from sound scientific methodology under these circumstances.237 
The fact that APL has been observed in studies of exposed workers was a piece 
of the total weight-of-the-evidence puzzle, indicating that the epidemiological 
evidence was at least consistent with the expert’s conclusion that benzene causes 
APL.238 
Thus, the appellate court found that plaintiff’s expert had reasonably applied 
a reliable methodology.239 Questions about the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the ultimate opinion go to the weight of the opinion, not its 
admissibility.240 This is how it should be. 
Unfortunately, upon remand, the trial court found that the plaintiff’s specific 
causation expert, though board certified in occupational medicine, pathology, and 
hematology was not qualified to interpret epidemiological studies.241 She 
therefore could not offer a reliable opinion to address cumulative exposure as a 
cause of increased risk of leukemia.242 Without a specific causation expert to link 
the plaintiff’s exposures to his illness, the court granted summary judgment to the 
defendant.243 
Finally in this regard, the West Virginia Supreme Court recently conducted a 
lengthy and thoughtful analysis of the Daubert process in Harris v. CSX 
Transportation, Inc.244 The court emphasized that the court’s gatekeeper role is 
simply to determine whether the expert’s science is reliable, not whether it is 
right: “right or wrong is not an issue of the admissibility of scientific 
evidence.”245 
Noting that the purpose of Daubert was to “liberalize the rules governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony” and that Rule 702 “is one of admissibility 
 
234. Id. at 24. 
235. Id.  
236. Id. at 17. 
237. Id. at 24. 
238. Id. at 25. 
239. Id. at 26. 
240. See id. 
241. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1285 at *36 (September 6, 2013). 
242. Id. 
243. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., No. 07-11944-DPW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127473, at 
*4025 (D. Mass. September Sept. 6, 2013). 
244. No. 12-1135, 2013 W. Va. LEXIS 1285 (W.V. Nov. 13, 2013). 
245. Id. at *11. 
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rather than exclusion, ”246 the court accused litigants of abusing the process and 
crowding dockets with unnecessary Daubert hearings.247 The court held instead, 
[W]hen a trial court is called upon to determine the admissibility of 
scientific expert testimony, in deciding the “reliability” prong of 
admissibility the focus of the trial court’s inquiry is limited to 
determining whether the expert employed a methodology that is 
recognized in the scientific community for rendering an opinion on the 
subject under consideration. If the methodology is recognized in the 
scientific community, the court should then determine whether the expert 
correctly applied the methodology to render his or her opinion. If these 
two factors are satisfied, and the testimony has been found to be relevant, 
and the expert is qualified, the expert may testify at trial.248 
The court went on to conclude that courts should take judicial notice of 
generally recognized scientific methodologies and reserve Daubert evidentiary 
hearings for new scientific and technical methodologies that cannot be judicially 
noticed and require a hearing to test reliability.249 Daubert hearings should not be 
held where qualified experts simply disagree about the interpretation of data 
obtained through standard methodologies.250 
Unfortunately, it is this author’s experience that defendants all too often file 
Daubert motions and seek evidentiary hearings where both sides’ experts apply 
the same methodologies but reach different conclusions. Too many courts then 
hold evidentiary hearings and allow challenges to underlying facts, 
interpretations of data, and opinions that are at variance from the defendants’ 
experts’ opinions, even though none of these are grounds for exclusion of expert 
testimony. 
PART IV: A FRAMEWORK FOR PRESENTING A PLAINTIFF’S EPIDEMIOLOGY 
EXPERT ON CAUSATION 
The cases addressed above, both favorable and unfavorable, suggest an 
approach for plaintiffs going into a Daubert hearing on the admissibility of the 
opinions of an expert epidemiologist. There are, of course, no guarantees, and 
there is bad law, and at times bad facts, to be overcome. 
First, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to fully explain to the court the 
weight-of-the-evidence and Bradford Hill methodologies. This should be briefed 
at length, and the expert should be prepared to address it both at deposition and in 
 
246. Id. at *5. 
247. Id. at *97. 
248. Id. at *96. 
249. Id. at *97. 
250. Id. at *98. 
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live testimony. It is critically important to show to the court how the various 
factors to be considered are “viewpoints” and not “criteria.” As Austin Bradford 
Hill wrote, “None of my nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or 
against the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua 
non.”
251
 
It is also important to emphasize that the weight-of-the-evidence 
methodology is used by American and international regulatory and standard-
setting agencies such as the EPA, OSHA, ATSDR, NTP, IARC and WHO.252 If 
the purpose of Rule 702 is to make sure that the expert witness uses the same 
rigor in an analysis in the courtroom as in the real world,253 then this evidence 
should be persuasive. 
A thorough discussion of the Milward and King cases and the evidentiary 
reliability of the weight-of-the-evidence methodology, because of its scientific 
validity, is imperative. It is also helpful to discuss those cases, such as U.S. v. 
W.R. Grace254 and Rubanick,255 which emphasize the court’s duty to take a 
“holistic approach” to expert testimony and not try to dissect the underlying data 
the expert relies upon.256 
Second, it is important to explain in the brief to the court, as well as through 
the expert’s testimony, the key principles of epidemiology and how 
epidemiologists apply them outside of the courtroom. This means discussing 
relative risk, statistical significance, dose-response, healthy worker effect, 
selection bias, biological plausibility, and the other terms that will arise. This 
allows you to show that the defendants’ views on these concepts are not 
mainstream science but distortions and misapplications of epidemiological 
principles. Discussing the King257 case can be particularly helpful in this regard. 
The court in King recognized a number of important principles that should be 
presented to the court in your case. First, epidemiological studies cannot prove 
causation but they can be the foundation for an opinion that an agent can cause a 
disease. To do this, the epidemiologist must determine how a “study’s findings fit 
with other scientific knowledge on the subject.”258 
Second, a plaintiff’s claim should not fail simply because the medical 
literature has not yet conclusively proven the connection between an agent and a 
disease. A plaintiff need only produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable person 
 
251. Sir Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 295, 297 (1965). 
252. See EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33992, 33996 (1986). 
253. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). 
254. 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011). 
255. 593 A.2d 733 (N.J.1991). 
256. See, e.g., W.R. Grace, 639 F.3d at 41 (noting Rule 702’s “holistic focus on an expert’s testimony”). 
257. 762 N.W. 2d 24. (Neb. 2009).  
258. Id. at 36.  
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to conclude that the exposure caused the injury.259 Only where “the underlying 
data are so lacking in probative force . . . that no reasonable expert could base an 
opinion on [that data] should an opinion be excluded.”260 
All an epidemiological study can do is show the strength of an association 
between an agent and an outcome.261 The strength of that association is reported 
as the relative risk.262 If the relative risk is greater than 1.0, a positive association 
exists because the risk to the exposed group is greater than the risk to the 
unexposed population.263 A relative risk greater than 1.0 thus supports a causal 
inference.264 
Where the relative risk is 2.0, the agent will have caused an equal number of 
injuries as all other background causes.265 Thus, if the relative risk is greater than 
2.0, this establishes a greater than 50% likelihood that the agent caused the 
injury.266 By showing that it is more likely than not that the agent caused the 
injury, a relative risk greater than 2.0 not only proves general causation, but 
many courts accept it as evidence of specific causation as well.267 
Some courts improperly exclude an expert’s opinion on general as well as 
specific causation where the expert relies on a study with a relative risk less than 
2.0.268 Other courts more properly recognize that any relative risk greater than 1.0 
is at least some evidence of a causal association and is thus relevant to the 
general causation inquiry.269 Just because a relative risk is less than 2.0 does not 
mean it is irrelevant: “weak associations can indicate a causal relationship, 
depending upon the presence of other factors.”270 Many workplace studies, for 
example, underestimate the relative risk.271 This is why the court in King refused 
to set a minimum threshold for relative risk, other than that a study must show a 
relative risk greater than 1.0 as some evidence of a causal association.272 Thus, 
“the significance of epidemiological studies with weak positive associations is a 
question of weight, not admissibility.”273 This principle is of paramount 
importance and must be emphasized to the court. 
 
259. Id. at 41.  
260. Id. at 45.  
261. Id. at 36. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 36–37. 
265. Id. at 37. 
266. Id. 
267. Id.  
268. See generally Merck & Co., Inc, v. Garza, 277 S.W.3d (Tex. 2008). 
269. King, 762 N.W. 2d at 37. 
270. Id. at 46. 
271. See id. at 37 n.131. 
272. Id. at 46. 
273. Id. at 46–47. 
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Defendants often seek to exclude epidemiological studies on the grounds that 
they are not statistically significant. Statistical significance measures the risk of 
random variations or chance causing the study’s results; a statistically significant 
result is not likely the result of chance.274 The risk can be shown as a p-value 
(which measures the probability that a positive association resulted from 
sampling error) or as a confidence interval (showing the magnitude and stability 
of the association).275 
However, there are confounding errors other than chance that could affect a 
study’s results but are not measured by statistical significance. For example, a 
data collection error, an underestimate or overestimate of exposure, or an 
improper comparison group could all impact a study’s results without showing 
up in a measure of statistical significance. Thus, a “poorly conceived or 
conducted study that is statistically significant could be far less reliable than a 
well-conceived and conducted study that is not statistically significant.”276 
While many courts prohibit reliance on studies that lack strong statistical 
significance, that does not mean a study with a weaker statistical significance 
does not show a causal relationship. Because of this, some courts refuse to 
impose a requirement for statistical significance where the expert can show that 
others in the field would rely on the study to support an opinion on causation.277 
In the end, any expert opinion on causation involves a subjective judgment. 
Contrary to what defendants most vociferously argue, proving causation is not an 
objective inquiry depending solely upon a statistically significant relative risk 
greater than 2.0.278 As the court noted in King, “a weight-of-the-evidence 
methodology . . . comprehensively analyzes data from different scientific fields, 
primarily animal tests and epidemiological studies, to assess carcinogenic 
risks.”279 This methodology is permissible even though there are no agreed-upon 
standards for how to weigh the particular pieces of evidence being considered.280 
Alternatively, many epidemiologists utilize the Bradford Hill “viewpoints” to 
assess causation, finding a causal relationship even where one or more of the 
factors are missing.281 
[S]ince causal actions of exposures are neither observable nor provable, a 
subjective element is present in judging whether, for a given exposure, 
such an action exists. As a result, scientists may differ both in terms of 
 
274. Id.   
275. Id. at 37–38.  
276. Id. at 39. 
277. Id. at 41. 
278. Id. at 39.  
279. Id.  
280. Id. at 39–40. 
281. Id. at 40.  
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interpretation of available evidence in support of criteria used to aid 
causal inference, and in relative weight assigned to each criteria.282 
Plaintiffs must show courts that the focus should only be on whether the 
expert used a valid methodology and has good grounds for the opinions 
offered.283 Even studies that do not draw a definitive conclusion on causation may 
be utilized where reasonable experts would rely on such a study.284 The fact that 
experts may disagree with the conclusions and opinions being offered is not a 
basis for exclusion but rather goes to the weight to be given to the evidence at 
trial.285 
Third, consider using an expert on scientific methodology at the Daubert 
hearing to bolster the testimony of your causation expert. Not only can this expert 
help with explaining the weight-of-the-evidence methodology, but he can also 
help explain where and how the defense experts misuse or misapply 
epidemiological concepts to mislead the court about how epidemiology is 
practiced in the real world. 
Whether or not you use a separate expert on methodology, your causation 
expert needs to initially prepare a detailed report that addresses each opinion and 
sub-opinion, discuss the scientific literature in support of the opinions being 
offered and show why any contrary literature is inapplicable, unreliable, or 
otherwise insufficient to alter his or her opinion. This report should also explain 
the weight-of-the-evidence methodology and how the various considerations, 
such as the Bradford Hill factors, were taken into account and balanced. Showing 
that the methodology used is comparable to what other experts have employed, 
particularly in a non-litigation setting, is imperative. Your trial expert must then 
be thoroughly prepared for deposition, making sure to be comfortable answering 
questions about all the scientific literature relied upon or deemed inapplicable. 
Again, being able to explain how various factors were considered and weighed 
can go a long way to preserving the admissibility of the ultimate opinions. 
If the expert reaches additional opinions, or relies upon new materials not 
addressed in his or her initial report, consider submitting a supplemental report, 
even if the new opinions or materials were addressed at deposition. All too often 
courts exclude some or all of an expert’s opinions where they have not been 
presented in a timely filed report or supplement.286 
Lastly, where you know you have a court disinclined to accept your 
explanation of epidemiology, consider moving under FRE 706 to have the court 
appoint a truly independent expert with no ties to industry to advise the court on 
 
282. Id.  
283. Id. at 49.  
284. Id. at 48–49. 
285. Id. at 49.  
286. See, e.g., Baker v. Chevron USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 865, 879 (S.D. Ohio 2010). 
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scientific processes, methods, and terms as applied in the laboratory and real 
world outside the courtroom. In this regard, it could be helpful to remind the 
court that Rule 702 does not require the judge to become an amateur scientist or 
to second guess an expert’s interpretation of underlying studies and data. The 
only relevant issue is whether the methodology employed by the expert is 
scientifically valid and relied upon by scientists in the field. 
CONCLUSION 
Epidemiology is often essential to proving a toxic tort case. It is critical that 
the court and counsel understand the role of the epidemiologist and the applicable 
standards to admit such an expert’s testimony. There is a growing body of law 
that supports the use of this kind of expert testimony in a reasonable and effective 
manner. It should be made clear that the court must look at scientific evidence as 
scientists do, taking all of the pieces as a whole, and not slice and dice to decide 
if each separate piece is sufficient in and of itself to support the overall opinion 
of the expert. As the court in King noted, “while the trial court acts as the 
evidentiary gatekeeper, it is not a goalkeeper.”287 
 
 
287. Id. at 43. 
